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Abstract—In this paper, we introduce the general concept of
coded power control (CPC) in a particular setting of the inter-
ference channel. Roughly, the idea of CPC consists in embedding
information (about the channel state) into the transmit power lev-
els themselves: in this new framework, provided the power levels
of a given transmitter can be observed by other transmitters, a
sequence of power levels of the former can therefore be used to
coordinate the latter. To assess the limiting performance of CPC
(and therefore the potential performance brought by this new
approach), we derive, as a first step towards many extensions of
the present work, a general result which not only concerns power
control (PC) but also any scenario involving two decision-makers
(DMs) which communicate through their actions and have the
following information and decision structures. We assume that
the DMs want to maximize the average of an arbitrarily chosen
instantaneous payoff function which depends on the DMs’ actions
and the state realization. DM 1 is assumed to know the state non-
causally (e.g., the channel state) which affects the common payoff
while DM 2 has only a strictly causal knowledge of it. DM 1 can
only use its own actions (e.g., power levels) to inform DM 2
about its best action in terms of payoff. Importantly, DM 2 can
only monitor the actions of DM 1 imperfectly and DM 2 does
not need to be observed by DM 1. The latter assumption leads
us to exploiting Shannon-theoretic tools in order to generalize
an existing theorem which provides the information constraint
under which the average payoff is maximized. The derived result
is then exploited to fully characterize the performance of good
CPC policies for a given instance of the interference channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider two decision-makers (DMs) and that each of
them has to select actions or take decisions repeatedly to
reach a common objective namely, to maximize an average
payoff function. Furthermore, assume that there might be
an interest for them in exchanging information e.g., about
the future events which can affect their payoff but that no
dedicated communication channel is available for this purpose.
Therefore, the only way to communicate for a DM is to use
his own actions. Although the idea of communicating through
actions seems to be quite natural and is in fact used more or
less implicitly in real life scenarios e.g., in economics (see
[1]), it appears that, apart from a few exceptions focused on
specific problems of control (see e.g., [2]), it has obviously
not penetrated yet engineering problems and definitely not
wireless communications. It turns out that important wireless
problems such as power control (PC) or radio resource allo-
cation can draw much benefits from being revisited from the
new perspective of communication through actions. Because
of its importance and ability to easily illustrate the proposed
approach, the problem of PC in interference networks has
been selected for the application of the main and general
result derived in this paper. Note that the latter concerns
any decision-making problem which has the same structure
(see Sec. II) and generalizes [3] (and [4] which exploits the
same theorem); in the (game-theoretical) setting of [3], DM 1
perfectly monitors the actions of DM 2 and conversely.
In the context of PC, the DMs are transmitters (Txs)
and the system state is typically given by the state of the
communication channel between the Txs and receivers (Rxs);
we will use the term DM (resp. Tx) when the general case
(resp. the specific case of PC) is concerned. Quite often, each
Tx possesses a partial knowledge of the channel state and,
in general, there is an incentive for the Txs to exchange
the corresponding knowledge between them. Coded power
control1 (CPC) assumes that this knowledge is transferred
from one Tx to another (or others) by encoding the information
of the former into a sequence of power levels which are
observed by the latter. CPC is, in particular, relevant in
cognitive radio (CR) settings. In typical CR scenarios, the
primary Tx is assumed to be passive and the secondary Tx
adapts to what it observes. But, it might be of interest to
design primary Txs which coordinate in an active manner the
usage of radio resources, which is exactly what CPC allows;
one of the salient features of CPC is that interference can
be managed directly in the radio-frequency domain and does
not require baseband detection or decoding, which is very
useful in heterogeneous networks. Another body of works
which can be mentioned is given by works on distributed
PC and especially those on best response dynamics (BRD)
algorithms which include the original iterative water-filling
algorithm [6]. Existing BRD algorithms implementations for
PC (see e.g., [7][8][9]) typically assume SINR (signal-to-
noise plus interference ratio) feedback and individual channel
state information (CSI) and do not exploit the key idea of
communicating through the power levels. Encoding power
levels allows one to construct PC policies possessing at least
three salient features which are generally not available for
BRD-based PC: there is no convergence problem and this
whatever the payoff functions; efficient solutions (e.g., in terms
of sum-payoff) can be obtained; both the cases of discrete
and continuous power levels can be easily treated. Since we
focus on optimal PC policies and make the choice of an
asymmetric information structure whereas BRD algorithms
rely on a symmetric one, no explicit comparison with BRD
algorithms is conducted but CPC can be applied to symmetric
scenarios as well.
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II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider two DMs which have to select actions repeatedly
(over T stages) and want to coordinate through their actions.
Let Xj , |Xj | < ∞, the action alphabet of DM j ∈ {1, 2},
and X0, |X0| < ∞, the random state alphabet. The states are
assumed to be i.i.d. and generated from a random variable X0
whose realizations are in X0 and distribution is denoted by ρ.
Note that the finiteness assumption is not only realistic (e.g.,
power levels are discrete in modern cellular systems) but also
allows the continuous case to be treated by using classical
arguments [10]. The strategies of DM 1 and 2 are sequences
of mappings, (σi, τi)i≥1, which are respectively defined by:{
σi : X
T
0 ×X
i−1
1 → X1
τi : X
i−1
0 × Y
i−1 ×X i−12 → X2
(1)
where T is the total number of stages, i ∈ {1, ..., T} is the
stage index, and Y , |Y| < ∞, is the observation alphabet
of DM 2. The definition of the strategy for DM 1 indicates
that we assume a non-causal knowledge of the state. The
most typical situation in PC is to assume that two phases
are available (training phase, action phase) and one state is
known in advance to adjust the power level. This special case
can be obtained by setting T = 2 that is, i ∈ {1, 2}. There are
many reasons why we consider here that T might be greater
than two. We will only provide three of them, which better
explains how the non-causality assumption may be understood.
First, the result derived in Sec. III can be used for a large
variety of settings and not only PC. Second, the proposed
approach can be applied to the case where the state is not
i.i.d. (e.g., to the B−stage block i.i.d. case, B ≥ 1). Indeed,
there exist wireless communication standards which assume
the channel to be constant over several time-slots and the
proposed approach suggests that gains can be obtained by
varying the power level from time-slot to time-slot even if the
channel is constant. Third, it becomes more and more common
to exploit the forecasted trajectory of a mobile user to optimize
the system [11], which makes our approach relevant when the
channel state is interpreted as the path loss. Concerning the
chosen definition for the strategy of DM 2, several comments
are in order. First, note that DM 2 is not assumed to monitor
actions of DM 1 perfectly. Rather, they are monitored through
an observation channel which is assumed to be discrete,
memoryless, and to verify P (y|x0, x1, x2) = Γ(y|x1), where
y ∈ Y is a realization of the channel output associated with the
input (x0, x1, x2). Second, note that, the strategy of DM 2 is
defined such that it can choose an action at every stage and not
only at the end of a block or sequence of stages as it would be
the case for a classical block decoder. Therefore, contrarily to
[3], DM 1 does not need to observe the actions of DM 2 and
DM 2 has only access to imperfect observations of the actions
chosen by DM 1. Interestingly, we will see that the fact that
DM 1 does not observe DM 2 induces no performance loss in
terms of payoff.
The instantaneous or stage payoff function for the DMs
is denoted by w(x0, x1, x2). Since the state is random, we
will consider as general case the problem of reaching a
certain performance level in terms of expected payoff E[w] =∑
(x0,x1,x2)
P (x0, x1, x2)w(x0, x1, x2). Roughly, the task of
DM 1 is to maximize the expected payoff by finding the best
tradeoff between reaching a good payoff for the current stage
and revealing enough information about the future realizations
of the state to coordinate for the next stages. The ability for
two DMs to coordinate their actions i.e., to reach a certain
value for the expected payoff can be translated in terms of
joint distribution over X0 × X1 × X2, which leads us to the
notion of implementable distribution [3].
Definition 1 (Implementability). The distribution
Q(x0, x1, x2) is implementable if there exists a pair of
strategies (σi, τi)i≥1 such that as t → ∞ we have for all
(x0, x1, x2),
1
t
t∑
i=1
∑
y∈Y
PX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi(x0, x1, x2, y)→ Q(x0, x1, x2)
(2)
where PX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi is the joint distribution induced by
(σi, τi)i≥1 at stage i.
Importantly, note that the set of feasible
payoffs which are reachable asymptotically
limT→∞
1
T
∑
i w(x0(i), x1(i), x2(i)) is a linear image
of the set of implementable distributions under the
expectation operator. Therefore, a certain value, say
w, is reachable asymptotically if and only if there
exists an implementable distribution Q such that
w = EQ[w]. The goal of the next section is precisely
to characterize the set of reachable expected payoffs
EQ[w] =
∑
(x0,x2,x2,y)
Q(x0, x1, x2)Γ(y|x1)w(x0, x1, x2),
which thus amounts to characterizing the set of implementable
distributions over X0 ×X1 ×X2.
III. MAIN ANALYTICAL RESULT
Notation: ∆(A) will stand for the set of distributions over
the generic discrete set A. Using this notation, the main
analytical result of this paper states as follows.
Theorem 1. Let Q ∈ ∆(X0 × X1 × X2) with∑
(x1,x2)
Q(x0, x1, x2) = ρ(x0). The distribution Q is imple-
mentable if and only if there exists Q ∈ ∆(X0×X1×X2×Y)
which verifies the following information constraint:
IQ(X0;X2) ≤ IQ(X1;Y |X0, X2) (3)
where the arguments of the mutual information IQ(.) are
defined from Q and Q(x0, x1, x2, y) = Q(x0, x1, x2)Γ(y|x1).
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Converse proof: We first start with providing a lemma
which is used at the end of the converse and concludes the
section.
Lemma 1. The function Φ : Q 7→ IQ(X0;X2) −
IQ(X1;Y |X0, X2) is convex over the set of distributions Q ∈
∆(X0×X1×X2×Y) that verify
∑
(x1,x2,y)
Q(x0, x1, x2, y) =
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ρ(x0) and Q(x0, x1, x2, y) = Γ(y|x1)P (x0, x1, x2), with ρ
and Γ fixed.
Proof of Lemma 1: The function Φ can be rewritten
as Φ(Q) = HQ(X0)−HQ(Y,X0|X2) +HQ(Y |X0, X2, X1).
The first term HQ(X0) = −
∑
x0
ρ(x0) log ρ(x0) is a constant
w.r.t. Q. The third term is linear w.r.t. Q since, with Γ fixed,
HQ(Y |X0, X2, X1) =
−
∑
x0,x1,x2,y
Q(x0, x1, x2, y) logP (y|x0, x1, x2)
= −
∑
x0,x1,x2,y
Q(x0, x1, x2, y) log Γ(y|x1) (4)
It is therefore sufficient to prove that HQ(Y,X0|X2) is con-
cave. Let λ1 ∈ [0, 1], λ2 = 1 − λ1, (Q1, Q2) ∈ ∆
2(X0 ×
X1 ×X2 ×Y) and Q = λ1Q1 + λ2Q2. By using the standard
notation A0 = ∅, An = (A1, ..., An), we have that:
HQ(Y,X0|X2) = −
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
x1,i
λiQi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[∑
x1,i
λiQi(x0, x1, x2, y)∑
i λiP
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(5)
= −
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
i
λi
∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[∑
i λi
∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)∑
i λiP
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(6)
≥ −
∑
i
λi
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[
λi
∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
λiP
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(7)
= −
∑
i
λi
∑
x0,x2,y
(∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
)
log
[∑
x1
Qi(x0, x1, x2, y)
P
Qi
X2
(x2)
]
(8)
= λ1HQ1(Y,X0|X2) + λ2HQ2(Y,X0|X2) (9)
where the inequality comes from the log sum inequality [10].
Now we want to prove that if Q is implementable,
then Q has to verify the information constraint. Assum-
ing Q is implementable means that there exists (σi, τi)i≥1
such that the empirical distribution P
(t)
X0,X1,X2,Y
(.) =
1
t
∑t
i=1 PX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi(.) can be made arbitrarily close to
Q; this argument is used at the end of the proof. We have:
t∑
i=1
IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X0;X2) =
t∑
i=1
I(X0,i;X2,i) (10)
(a)
=H(Xt0)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i) (11)
=H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−H(Y
t, Xt2|X
t
0)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i)
(12)
≤H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−H(Y
t|Xt0)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i) (13)
≤H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−H(Y
t|Xt0, X
t
1, X
t
2)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i)
(14)
(b)
=H(Xt0, Y
t, Xt2)−
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i|X2,i)
−
t∑
i=1
H(Yi|X0,i, X1,i, X2,i) (15)
(c)
≤
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i, Yi, X2,i|X2,i)−H(X0,i|X2,i)
−H(Yi|X1,i, X0,i, X2,i) (16)
=
t∑
i=1
H(X0,i, Yi|X2,i)−H(X0,i|X2,i)
−H(Yi|X1,i, X0,i, X2,i) (17)
=
t∑
i=1
I(X1,i;Yi|X0,i, X2,i) (18)
=
t∑
i=1
IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X1;Y |X0, X2) (19)
where: (a) comes from the fact that (X0,i)i is i.i.d.
and the chain rule for entropy; (b) holds because the ob-
servation channel from DM 1 to DM 2 is assumed to
be discrete and memoryless namely, P (yt|xt0, x
t
1, x
t
2) =∏t
i=1 p(yi|x0,i, x1,i, x2,i); (c) holds by the chain rule and
because X2,i is a deterministic function of the past: X2,i =
τi (X0,1, Y1, X2,1, . . . , X0,i−1, Yi−1, X2,i−1). Now, since Φ is
convex (by Lemma 1), we know that
I
P
(t)
X0,X1,X2,Y
(X1;Y |X0, X2)− IP (t)
X0,X1,X2,Y
(X0;X2) ≥
1
t
t∑
i=1
IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X1;Y |X0, X2)
− IPX0,i,X1,i,X2,i,Yi (X0;X2) (20)
The converse follows by observing that the first term
of the above inequality can be made arbitrarily close to
IQ(X1;Y |X0, X2) − IQ(X0;X2) and the second term has
been proven to be non-negative.
Implementability (sketch): The goal here is to prove that
if the information constraint is verified, then an implementable
pair of strategies (σi, τi)i≥1 can be found. Therefore, in
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contrast with the converse, finding a particular code such as
a block code with long codewords is sufficient, which allows
one to reuse the standard machinery for the transmission of
distorted sources. The methodology is therefore to assume
T = nB is large where n is the codeword length and B
the number of blocks, and exploit the block Markov coding
idea as a particular case of general strategy. By denoting b
as the block index, the strategy of DM 2 is taken to be
the mapping ψ : (xn0 (b), y
n(b), xn2 (b)) 7→ x
n
2 (b + 1). Since
DM 1 knows the state for the next block whose index is
b + 1 (and also xn0 (b)), the strategy of DM 1 is taken to be
the mapping φ : (xn0 (b + 1), x
n
0 (b), x̂
n
2 (b)) 7→ x
n
1 (b) where
x̂n2 (b) = ψ(x
n
0 (b−1), x
n
1 (b−1), x̂
n
2 (b−1)). At last, for block
b = 0, DM 2 chooses an arbitrary codeword which is known
to DM 1s. Under this setting, it can be shown that if Q meets
the information constraint then the empirical distribution Q(T )
which is induced by a separate source channel coding i.e.,
Q(T )(v) =
1
nB
[
N
(
v | xn0 (0), x
n
1 (0), x
n
2 (0), y
n(0)
)
+
B−1∑
b=1
N
(
v | xn0 (b), x
n
1 (b), x
n
2 (b), y
n(b)
)]
converges to Q, where N (v|vn) is a notation for counting the
occurrences of v in vn, v = (x0, x1, x2, y) here.
B. Comments on Theorem 1
Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows. DM 2’s actions
(represented by X2) correspond to a joint source-channel
decoding operation with distortion on the information source
(which is represented by X0). To be reachable, the distortion
rate has to be less than the transmission rate allowed by the
channel whose input and output are respectively represented
by X1 and Y . Therefore, the pair S = (X0, X2) seems to
play the same role as the side information in channels with
state. Indeed, the implementability proof shows that DM 1 uses
in particular (xn0 (b), x̂
n
2 (b)) while DM 2 uses (x
n
0 (b), x
n
2 (b)).
Asymptotically, the encoder (DM 1) and decoder (DM 2) have
the same side information; this observation is one of the key
elements of the implementability proof. It explains why the
fact that DM 1 does not need to observe DM 2 does not induce
any performance loss. Furthermore, note that xn0 (b+1), which
plays the role of the message to be encoded, is independent
of the side information. Classical coding schemes (such as
block Markov coding) can thus be re-exploited. However, the
above arguments fails for the converse proof which has to
deal with arbitrary coding schemes or strategies. It can no
longer be assumed that the side information be independent
of the information source vector. This is one of the reasons
why the converse proof has to be rethought. Another reason
is that classical results (such as Fano’s inequality) which rely
on block decoding are not exploitable anymore since DM 2
has to be able to act (to decode) at any stage or time instance.
As another type of comments on Theorem 1, it can be
noted that the information constraint has a very attractive
property: the problem of maximizing the expected payoff takes
a particularly simple form. Indeed, by defining a one-to-one
mapping between the quadruplets (x0, x1, x2, y) and the finite
set {1, 2, ..., L}, L = |X0 × X1 × X2 × Y|, the optimization
problem of interest can be described as follows:
minimize −Eq[w] = −
L∑
`=1
q`w`
subject to Iq(X0;X2)− Iq(X1;Y |X0, X2) ≤ 0
−q` ≤ 0
−1 +
L∑
`=1
q` = 0
∀x0,
∑
`∈LX0 (x0)
q` − ρ(x0) = 0
∀(x1, y),
∑
`∈LX1,Y
(x1,y)
q`
∑
`∈LX1
(x1)
q`
− Γ(y|x1) = 0
(21)
where q` is the probability of a given quadruplet
(x0, x1, x2, y), w` is the value of the corresponding payoff,
the vector q = (q1, ..., qL) represents the distribution Q, and
the sets of indices LX0(x0), LX1,Y (x1, y), LX1(x1) merely
translate the marginalization conditions. By Lemma 1, it
follows that the above optimization problem is convex, which
makes easy the determination of the information-constrained
maximum of the expected payoff. A simple and useful upper
bound for this maximum is Eρmax(x1,x2) w(x0, x1, x2). This
bound will be referred to as the costless communication case
in Sec. IV. Indeed, this bound can be attained in the ideal
scenario where: given the knowledge of the coming state x0,
DM 1 computes an optimal solution for the action pair for the
coming stage (x∗1, x
∗
2) ∈ argmax(x1,x2) w(x0, x1, x2) and can
inform DM 2 of x∗2 without any cost. If the state is stationary
for say S stages and X1 = X2, a simple strategy for DM 1 can
be as follows: x1(1) = x
∗
2, x1(2) = x
∗
1, ..., x1(S) = x
∗
1. This
allows DM 2 to choose an optimal action for i ∈ {2, ..., S}.
It can be shown that considering the S−stage block i.i.d. case
amounts to multiplying the left term of (3) by 1
S
, which makes
the information constraint arbitrarily mild as S grows large.
IV. APPLICATION TO POWER CONTROL OVER
INTERFERENCE CHANNELS
The main goal is to assess the performance of simple
CPC policies and those of good policies; the performance
of the latter is obtained by exploiting Theorem 1. A flat-
fading interference channel (IC) with two Tx-Rx pairs is
considered. Transmissions are assumed to be time-slotted and
synchronized. For j ∈ {1, 2} and “k = −j” (−j stands for
the Tx other than j), the SINR at receiver j at a given stage
writes as SINRj =
gjjxj
N+gkjxk
where xj ∈ X
IC
j = {0, Pmax}
is the power level chosen by Tx j, gjk represents the channel
gain of link jk, and N the noise variance. We assume that:
gjk ∈ {gmin, gmax} is i.i.d. and Bernouilli distributed gjk ∼
B(pjk) with P (gjk = gmin) = pjk. We define SNR[dB] =
10 log10
Pmax
N
and set gmin = 0.1, gmax = 1.9, N = 1.
The low and high interference regimes (LIR, HIR) are respec-
tively defined by (p11, p12, p21, p22) = (0.5, 0.9, 0.9, 0.5) and
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(p11, p12, p21, p22) = (0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.5). The assumed pay-
off is wIC(x0, x1, x2) =
∑2
j=1 f(SINRj(x0, x1, x2)) where
f(a) = log(1+a) unless stated otherwise. At last, we assume
that Y ≡ X1. We consider four CPC policies :
I the full power control (FPC) policy xj = Pmax for every
stage. FPC requires no CSI at all;
I the semi-coordinated PC (SPC) policy x2 = Pmax, x
†
1 ∈
argmaxx1 w
IC(x0, x1, Pmax). SPC requires the knowledge of
the current state realization at Tx1;
I the optimal CPC policy (OCPC) whose performance is
obtained, in particular, when the problem has the information
structure of Theorem 1;
I the costless communication case (see Sec. III-B) for which
the maximum of wIC can be reached at any stage. Fig. 1 and 2
depict the relative gain in % in terms of average payoff versus
SNR[dB] which is obtained by FPC, SPC, OCPC, and costless
case. Compared to FPC, gains are very significant whatever the
interference regime and provided the SNR has realistic values.
Compared to SPC, the gain is of course less impressive since
SPC is precisely a coordinated PC scheme but, in the HIR and
when the communication cost is negligible, gains as high as
25% can be obtained with f(a) = log(1 + a) and 45% with
f(a) = a.
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Fig. 1. Relative gain in terms of average payoff (“OCPC/FPC− 1” in [%])
vs SNR[dB] obtained with CPC (with and without communication cost) when
the reference power control policy is to transmit at full power (FPC).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although some assumptions made in this paper might be
too restrictive in some application scenarios, it is essential to
understand that the used methodology to derive the optimal
performance is general. It can be applied to analyze the per-
formance of coded power allocation, coded interference align-
ment, etc, with other information structures and by considering
N ≥ 2 individual payoffs instead of a common one (e.g.,
in a game-theoretic setting [3]). The methodology to assess
the performance of good coded policies consists in deriving
the right information constraint(s) by building the proof on
Shannon theory for the problem of multi-source coding with
distortion over multi-user channels wide side information and
then to use this constraint to find an information-constrained
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Fig. 2. The difference with Fig. 1 is that the reference power control policy
is the SPC policy. Additionally, the top curve is obtained with f(a) = a.
maximum of the payoff (common payoff case) or the set
of Nash equilibrium points which are compatible with the
constraint (non-cooperative game case). Note that assuming
the state(s) to be i.i.d. from stage to stage leads in fact to
the worst-case scenario for the information constraint. On the
other hand, the costless communication case provides an upper
bound for the expected payoff. As a key observation of this
paper, the communication structure of a multi-person decision-
making problem corresponds in fact to a multiuser channel.
Therefore, multi-terminal Shannon theory is not only relevant
for pure communication problems but also for any multi-
person decision-making problem. The above observation also
opens new challenges for Shannon-theorists since decision-
making problems define new communication channels.
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